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Narrative, Social Identity and Practical Reason: 
On Charles Taylor and Moral Theology 
 
Mark Ryan 
 
HIS ARTICLE SEEKS TO DISCERN what we as moral theologi-
ans can learn from Charles Taylor, particularly his work on 
the modern self and the conditions surrounding belief in the 
modern, secular age.1 In recent work, Taylor has gone further 
than before in bringing into play his own Christian faith, making an 
intra-Christian dialogue with him possible. There is an opening here 
for drawing out some of the implications of his arguments for moral 
theology.  
Taylor would seem to offer rich ground to the work of the Catholic 
moral theologian, insofar as he resists naturalist accounts of human 
action and explores the role theism might play in negotiating the con-
flicts of the western identity. Taylor’s work may also be taken as re-
sembling what moral theologians do, insofar as he often describes it 
as “practical reasoning.” Running through his descriptive analyses of 
periods of Western history, his engagement with social science, and 
his criticism of contemporary moral theory, one finds the basic ques-
tions, “What is the good human beings seek?” “Where does human 
flourishing lie?” and “How is this good embodied in societies?” We 
might refer to this as the basic anthropological center of Taylor’s 
work, as it has developed over the years.2 
Further, though it is in large part about a historical and descriptive 
study of the conditions of religious belief, together with the emergence 
of secularism, across the last 500 years, the argument of Taylor’s A 
Secular Age (2007) leads toward the problem of what it means to be a 
Christian in our day.3 Here Taylor comes quite close to the preoccu-
pation of moral theologians, insofar as we aspire to help Christians to 
go on, practically, in the concrete circumstances of life. Yet there are 
also indications that what Taylor offers here will be inadequate for our 
task, or at least leave us with many important questions yet to be an-
swered. 
                                                     
1 Charles Taylor, Sources of The Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University, 1992). 
2 Charles Taylor, Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers 1 (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University, 1985), 1. 
3 Taylor, A Secular Age, (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2007), 728-72. 
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I believe the reaction of one astute Catholic reader of Taylor gives 
expression to the problem I am signaling. Peter Steinfels, after follow-
ing him through several hundred pages on the contemporary predica-
ment of religious believers, reports feeling deflated by Taylor’s prac-
tical suggestions regarding where to go from here.4 Taylor’s examples 
of significant Christians who confront the conditions he has traced are 
drawn from a set of creative elites or “religious virtuosi” (Peguy, Ma-
ritain, Hopkins). What hope or guidance is held out for the typical sub-
urban parish? This frustration, I think, responds to the somewhat ethe-
real quality of Taylor’s tour de force through history as he makes his 
argument. 
In short, Taylor’s work has many attractions for moral theologians 
today, but there are also some warning signs. Could Taylor’s work 
turn out to be a temptation for us? I will explore that question through 
the essay and offer a conclusion.  
The paper has three parts. The first part recapitulates and examines 
Taylor’s narrative in A Secular Age in order to both clarify what 
“moral anthropology” and “practical reason” mean for Taylor and en-
able us to see what a “theological anthropology” (or, going on in our 
times as a Christian) would look like for Taylor. Part two presents 
Jewish philosopher Martin Kavka’s response to Taylor. Kavka shows 
why the anthropology that Taylor employs in A Secular Age makes it 
easy for him to neglect to include the Jews in his grand narrative, and 
he provides a glimpse of the Jewish way of going on in secular times. 
Part three elucidates, beginning with a response to Kavka’s criticisms 
of him, a recommended disposition (i.e., wariness) for moral theolo-
gians toward Taylor’s work.  
 
THE STORY: PRACTICAL REASON, HISTORY  
AND THE AGE OF AUTHENTICITY   
Taylor’s narrative account of the modern identity and the modern 
age is not typical history; it combines moral anthropology and narra-
tive.5 Like the moral theologian, he is concerned about the agent’s per-
spective. He seeks, that is, to uncover the moral motivations and sen-
sibilities of human agents that underlie human history, allowing his-
torical events to be intelligible to us, while at the same time providing 
at least one of the “causes” (i.e., moral agency) of these events. He 
                                                     
4 Peter Steinfels, “Modernity and Belief,” Commonweal (May 5, 2008). 
5 Indeed, Taylor’s blending of the empirical and the normative has drawn criticism 
from historians. See Jonathan Sheehan, “When Was Disenchantment? History and the 
Secular Age,” in Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age, ed. Michael Warner, Jon-
athan VanAntwerpen, and Craig Calhoun (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 
2010), 217-42. Here, I should also note that in what follows I read A Secular Age as 
in continuity with the project of Sources of the Self, and thus go back and forth be-
tween them.  
30 Mark Ryan 
 
speaks of these motivations and sensibilities as “sources”—basic hu-
man orientations toward goodness/flourishing.6 So, the first peculiar-
ity of Taylor’s narrative history is that it focuses on the moral sources 
of an age—both as these sources ground our identities and as they pro-
vide a background of meaning for our shared life.  
He further tries to uncover how the sources of one age emerge in 
transition from the sources of an earlier age—a transition in which our 
self-understandings are gradually transformed. His account of the hu-
man agent within society that underlies the Age of Authenticity—the 
major dispensation of sources he outlines that is closest to us today—
has its roots in an earlier transition from a “porous” identity to a “buff-
ered” identity. He uses the term porous identity to describe the way in 
which the pre-modern agent felt vulnerable (permeable) to an array of 
forces, both evil and good, in the surrounding cosmos. The moral life 
of the pre-modern agent is a matter of properly negotiating these 
forces, or of putting oneself in right relation to the best and highest 
among them. In Sources of the Self, Taylor described the porous iden-
tity as the kind of identity established by agents for whom the good 
was an external source, or a source existing “without.”  
In his account of this transition—the “Work of Reform”—Taylor 
describes how this vulnerability and permeability are exchanged for a 
“buffered self” whose moral sources are increasingly located “within.” 
This transition takes us from the medieval into the modern age and it 
has many facets. While what has changed is perhaps not clearly ex-
pressed until the eighteenth century, many of its reforming motives 
can be seen in movements within the church as early as the thirteenth 
century.7 
 Eighteenth century “Providential Deism” describes another im-
portant change. It names the period during which the buffered self be-
comes able to invent the moral sources that make possible a com-
pletely “immanent” background of meaning. This background of 
meaning, powered by internal sources such as a conception of human 
freedom as disengagement from the surrounding cosmos, consists in 
the picture of a simply reasonable social order whose purpose is uni-
versal benevolence, where benevolence is understood in terms of 
providing material welfare. In the wake of the ascendancy of Provi-
dential Deism, exclusive humanism and atheism become live options 
for the first time.8  
                                                     
6 In A Secular Age, he broadens and makes more complex the notion of a moral source, 
familiar from Sources, through that of a “social imaginary.” Taylor, A Secular Age, 
171-6. 
7 On the side of religion, Taylor emphasizes the Hildebrandine reformation issuing in 
a new attempt to lead ordinary lay persons into strict accountability for a life of disci-
pleship to Christ. This was manifested materially in a new requirement of one to one 
confession for all church members. A Secular Age, 242-3. 
8 Taylor, A Secular Age, 221-69. 
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The Age of Authenticity originates in a further transition. The orig-
inal version of the buffered identity conceived of a person’s worth as 
an agent in terms of the powers to control both one’s own bodily life 
and one’s own environment by means of self-discipline and instru-
mental reason. Gradually (here we are entering into the late eighteenth 
and on into the nineteenth centuries), symptoms arose of dissatisfac-
tion and loss within some quarters of the buffered age. The loss was 
of a sense of meaningful connection to an external order; this in turn 
was seen to impoverish our full capacities as agents. The receding of 
the God in whom orthodox Christians confessed belief was one form 
of this loss. The recognition of this loss spurred a movement, the Ro-
mantic Movement, to reconnect the agent to sources of meaningful-
ness and wholeness. Even so, the moral sources of self-control and 
instrumental power over the environment remained grounds of the 
buffered agent’s dignity.9 Thus the self of the Age of Authenticity is 
best understood as a conception of the agent existing under the “cross-
pressure” of rival sources: instrumental reason and romantic expres-
siveness.10 
Because of its importance to a critique of Taylor later on, let me 
spell out further the nature of the Romantic reaction to the buffered 
self of the Enlightenment. To do this, we need to see that the effort of 
the cross-pressured self, through diverse strands of romanticism, to 
reconnect with nature had the shape of an interior quest. A public order 
of meaning fades away with the “porous self;” the buffered age de-
mands that we search for natural depths “within.” These inner depths, 
and their sensibilities, become the locus in which a connection to an 
external and harmonious nature can be recovered.11 Yet, because of 
the resistance of instrumental reason and its fragmenting tendencies, 
cross-pressured agents have to work at (re-) integrating these inner 
depths so that “the harmony of nature” can resonate within them. The 
“agent” of this work of re-integration is creative imagination (genius), 
which gives expression to nature and at the same time constitutes our 
relatedness to it. (Because in the modern world there is no publically 
available conception of nature, only imaginative expression can give 
us access to nature.) The history of art in these centuries mirrors this 
transition, as a conception of art as mimesis gives way to an emphasis 
on idiosyncratic creative vision of the individual artist.12 The agent’s 
                                                     
9 For a clear account of how the neo-Aristotelian account of the human being devel-
oped by Romantics such as Herder, was still significantly a modern account, see Tay-
lor’s Hegel, 17-28. 
10 While the good of instrumental reason is found in domination over external nature, 
that of romantic expressivism is found in a harmony between “internal” and “external” 
nature. 
11 Taylor, A Secular Age, 313-17. 
12 More specifically, the drive to reform and its buffered self interrupt the mimetic 
approach and order of meaning on which it depends. This gives rise to an epoch in 
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(creative) activity in unveiling nature as a source of meaning—by, in 
part, constituting nature as meaningful through expression—is crucial 
to the reintegration. To put it simply, the meaning is now to be 
achieved by means of an interior quest. Christian creative elites named 
by Taylor (such as Gerard Manley Hopkins and Charles Peguy) may 
be seen as exemplars along the path of this quest. More to the point, 
these latter provide modern examples of Christian “conversion”—that 
is, of how a Christian may recover (or discover) her faith in a trans-
cendent source by breaking through the buffered or immanent frame 
in a way marked by the cross pressures of authenticity.13  
This narrative of sources and their historical transitions is integral 
to what Taylor means by “practical reasoning.” What is the good of 
human life? For Taylor, the good plays the role of a source which ori-
ents us with an identity by mapping out for us and for our communities 
what matters most. Who am I? (Who are we?) Practical reasoning con-
sists in articulating and re-articulating the self-source relation in dia-
logue with others. We are striving to understand human nature and 
human fulfillment more clearly, and more clear-sightedly, we seek 
such fulfillment. But our identities are historical and communal, so the 
way these identities unfold historically is essential to understanding 
them (thus, ourselves). Historical perspective, further, gives us the op-
portunity put in conversation the inherited voices of our pasts and pre-
sent. Is the conception of identity in the early modern period a gain 
over that of the medieval period? In what respects? Is the immanent 
frame in which we live open to transcendence, and if so should we opt 
for the latter? Practical reason names the ongoing effort to provide 
reasoned—in the sense of “oriented to truth”—judgments about such 
matters.14  
                                                     
which the artist is called upon to invent new forms that invent and express meaning 
at the same time through “subtler languages” that go beyond typical forms. Thus, this 
vision of art and the artist is a response to, and shaped by these historical circum-
stances. See, Taylor, A Secular Age, 352-61. 
13 What I think must be challenged here is not Taylor’s attribution of significance to 
these figures in itself, but how he fits them into his narrative account of the Christian 
predicament. By emphasizing the path they forge through the existential complexities 
of modernity, he at the same time downplays the way they have been (e.g. Hopkins) 
formed in the life of the church. The importance of this formation is something I will 
come back to. I owe this insight in part to Matthew Whelan’s comments on an earlier 
version of this essay. Personal Correspondence, June 22, 2012. For a similar argu-
ment, see Stanley Hauerwas and Romand Coles, “‘Long Live the Weeds and the Wil-
derness Yet’: Reflections on A Secular Age,” Modern Theology 26.3 (July 2010), 355-
7. 
14 What would this look like in a concrete case? Taylor provides an illustration of how 
his conception of reasoning makes a difference to historical interpretation much later 
in the book, A Secular Age, when he applies to the debate around the meaning of 
Vatican II. Since we live within histories of transitions—i.e., within the pull of distinct 
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What does his narrative suggest for how Christians are to go on in 
our times? Or, put differently, what would a “theological anthropol-
ogy” look like for Taylor? Taylor avers that, in light of the history of 
sources he has narrated and especially the creation of purely immanent 
sources, no believer can hold her faith with the confidence possible in 
ages past. We are fated to be aware that faith is not the only possibility 
for us. However fervent they may be in it, believers are aware that 
their faith has been made “fragile” by the presence of different faiths 
or lives lived without faith. Thus, we all live on a secularized or “im-
manent” landscape. The question of theological anthropology is that 
of how we choose to “spin” the sources bequeathed to us. One option 
is to read, or spin, the immanent existential frame so as to be “closed” 
to transcendence. Alternatively, there is a spin that sees it as “open.” 
Taylor’s theological anthropology asks what is signified by spinning 
                                                     
conceptions of fulfillment--Taylor’s approach to practical reason requires close atten-
tion to experience.14 Practical reason sometimes takes the form of “ad hominem” ar-
gument, as he puts it. 
The way we interpret and assess Vatican II, and the changes it generated in Ca-
tholicism, can take two (argumentative) forms, Taylor avers. According to the first 
form, partisans will line up against each other and take a black/white stance, asking, 
“Was Vatican II was good/bad for Catholicism? Was it a gain or a loss?” Debaters 
may look at various sides of the council, finding some things positive and some neg-
ative. But in the end, it’s either “thumbs up” or “thumbs down.” The statement, “Vat-
ican II was a gain,” must be either true or false. Coming to an absolute verdict drives 
the whole approach. For this reason, the context out of which the promoters of the 
council acted is of interest only to explain why it pushed them to do wrong, or right. 
The second form of argument, which Taylor recommends, approaches Vatican II 
in a different spirit. Rather than being driven by the supposed necessity to make a 
summary judgment, we can attend to the council as expressing certain insights about 
Christian faith. These insights, furthermore, grow out of the experience of particular 
Christians of the time who were themselves struggling to respond well to the historical 
conditions in which they found themselves. Following this line, we will want to attend 
closely to the personal spiritual journey, the “itinerary of faith,” expressed in the lives 
of Catholics like Charles Peguy or Henri DeLubac who inspired the council. By “itin-
erary of faith” Taylor refers to the shape of one person’s quest for authentic Christi-
anity that cannot be loosed from their experience, though it may speak to many others. 
And this can only be understood by attending both to the milieu out of which she 
thought and acted and to her actions and thoughts themselves.  
When we approach practical reasoning this way, we assess an expression of faith 
(or, of the council, in this case) not primarily in order to determine whether it gets a 
single issue right or wrong. Rather, we take it that “what is at stake is complementary 
insights,” each of which “bring[s] a fresh perspective which augments and enriches 
our understanding” (752). Taylor’s conception of practical reasoning thus urges a gen-
erosity born of the requisite humility to say, “I don’t have all the insights.” Thus, 
Taylor writes, “instead of reaching immediately for the weapons of polemic, we might 
better listen for a voice which we could never have assumed ourselves, whose tone 
might have forever been unknown to us if we hadn’t strained to understand it” (754). 
Thus, for Taylor practical reason signifies an open-ended conversation in which we 
attend to each other, including our companions from other times, not simply as right 
or wrong, but as embodying an insight (of faith, in this case) to which we might oth-
erwise have no access. 
34 Mark Ryan 
 
the immanent frame as “porous” to transcendent conceptions of full-
ness. 
 
A JEWISH CHALLENGE TO TAYLOR 
 I now turn to Jewish philosopher Martin Kavka and his response 
to Taylor’s project in A Secular Age. Kavka interrupts the flow of Tay-
lor’s grand story by pointing to what Taylor leaves out—namely, the 
Jews. Going further, he provides a portrait of what is lost by Taylor, 
by pointing to concrete resources for how religious persons are to go 
on in our times. In the next section, I will suggest that the fates of the 
Jews and of Christians are linked in Taylor’s grand narrative. 
As we saw above, Taylor’s work is driven by his construction and 
revision of a moral and theological anthropology. In this regard, he 
has been asking, “What is the good?” and “What is a full human life?” 
In his most recent work, he is especially concerned with how religious 
belief enters into the answering of these questions. Specifically, in our 
secular age, he puts the question in terms of whether the “immanent 
frame” of existence which we have developed can be “spun” as open 
to “transcendence.” As we also saw, these questions do not pertain 
merely to the individual as an atomized “self,” but include the social 
imaginary within which flourishing is understood. The basic question 
driving Kavka’s rejoinder to A Secular Age is, “What is immanent in 
Judaism?”15 
 Kavka identifies Taylor’s moral anthropology with Taylor’s larger 
goal of a reconciling philosophical narrative, and he places A Secular 
Age in relation to Taylor’s work as a whole, with particular attention 
to its Hegelian roots. As just hinted, there is a social purpose in Tay-
lor’s construction of a moral and theological anthropology. Conflicts 
over basic anthropological questions are at the root of a personal and 
social identity crisis. In Sources of the Self, Taylor wonders whether 
the moral ontologies of the Western mind would any longer be suffi-
cient to support the practical, moral commitments we have made to 
such notions as universal human rights and the alleviation of suffering 
for all. In A Secular Age, he has his sights set on seemingly intractable 
issues of the culture wars, such as homosexuality.  
Kavka, therefore, identifies Taylor’s moral anthropology with his 
larger goal of personal, social, and metaphysical unity. The history of 
moral and spiritual sources Taylor constructs ultimately aims to ame-
liorate the tensions (the “malaise” as he has previously called it) in 
                                                     
15 Martin Kavka, “What is Immanent in Judaism: Transcending Charles Taylor’s A 
Secular Age,” The Journal of Religious Ethics, 40, no. 1 (March 2012): 123-37. 
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Western social life, be it in the form of a deeper “politics of recogni-
tion,”16 or some other unity in our diversity.17 In A Secular Age, he is 
particularly focusing on the conflicts of self-interpretation between re-
ligious people and those who proclaim some form of non-belief, each 
of which comes in several varieties that don’t always reconcile easily 
with one another. He articulates these differences with such anthropo-
logical questions as: Are the satisfactions of life, liberty and the satis-
faction of ordinary desires enough? Or, does the human heart remain 
restless? What might provide unity (reconciliation) between such 
groups? His hope is that his history will go deep enough into their 
shared genome of moral sources that some commonality might be 
found. 
Kavka further notes that Taylor’s theological anthropology is 
deeply shaped by Taylor’s chastened Hegelianism. Taylor wrote two 
substantial books on Hegel early in his career, and the problems en-
gaged there have been enduring for him. To begin, the language of 
“immanence” versus “transcendence” resembles Hegelian language 
for describing the unfolding of objective Spirit in his dialectic. Kavka 
notes that Taylor has always been driven by the twin aims of resisting 
behaviorism’s attempt at an “objectivist” explanation of the agent’s 
experience and seeking a nuanced universalism that would allow us to 
make progress toward recognition and harmony. This project leads to 
“a view of history as a perpetual groping after new, better, and fresher 
explanatory models.”18  
We also find here Hegel’s terminology of “alienation and recogni-
tion.” The human desire for self-realization leads inevitably to aliena-
tion when the agent fails to find its “particular mode of self-realization 
[to] be reflected by nature or by others.”19 Taylor’s re-narration of the 
universal (or what I have been calling his theological anthropology), 
in other words, hopes to bring us further along the quest of social har-
mony such that the self’s longing for recognition might be satisfied 
(the longing to have one’s sense of identity reflected by nature and by 
others). Kavka shows that Taylor’s Hegelianism shapes his theologi-
cal anthropology. Thus, about Taylor, he writes, “The mediation of 
transcendence is described… only in terms of the production of a 
frame in which members of a polity can make choices about the good 
life.”20 
                                                     
16 Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (Prince-
ton: Princeton University, 1994). 
17 His approach to debate within the church, which I described above, is one form of 
this “reconciling of the solitudes.” I think it is in a specific context like this one that 
his work may be most helpful to us as moral theologians. 
18 Kavka, “What is Immanent,” 124 
19 Kavka, “What is Immanent,” 124 
20 Kavka, “What is Immanent,” 130. 
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Kavka goes on to note that these Hegelian categories, and German 
idealism more generally, have been unable to cope with the particu-
larity of the Jewish tradition and thus are frequently blind to Jewish 
markers. (Indeed, members of the idealist movement often sought to 
eradicate the Jewish roots of Christianity.) As Kavka’s title question—
“What is immanent in Judaism?”—hints, Taylor’s anthropology is un-
surprisingly ill-suited to cope with Judaism. It is therefore unsurpris-
ing that Taylor fails to include the Jews in his narrative. 
Indeed, the Hegelian anthropology described above seems destined 
to be anxious about the presence of religious difference. When human 
desire fixates on the harmony of visions that seems forever out of 
reach, it is easy for a kind of tragic longing to set in. This might tempt 
one to paper over differences that are in fact rather intractable. Put 
differently, Kavka can be seen as calling attention to the ambitious 
scope of Taylor’s story. Taylor’s purpose may be to find reconciliation 
in Western society’s relation to religion. But do citizens of the North 
Atlantic world have a religion? Who is the “we”? Kavka’s point, 
again, is that Taylor overlooks the Jews in his narrative. Or rather, he 
writes them into another category with inelegant concepts like that of 
“Judeo-Christian” traditions. 
Taylor cannot but miss the Jews, it seems to Kavka, because the 
anthropological frame Taylor employs cannot accommodate, and 
would inevitably distort, the ways Jews reason practically and seek 
fulfillment. But his point is not only to explain an important gap in 
Taylor’s history (indeed a troubling one given Taylor’s aims). He also 
aims, in his brief but poignant retrieval of Maimonides’s account of 
law, to present the advantages of the rabbinic approach to coping with 
the cultural conflicts in our day.  
Kavka’s central claim is that, for the Jew, God has always already 
mediated himself in law as received and interpreted by Jewish prac-
tices. Such law not only relates us to God, but also allows us to take 
part in God’s will. “The word is very near to you; it is in your mouth 
and in your heart for you to observe” (Deut 30:14). In other words, the 
Jewish people together with their Scriptures and reading practices both 
discover God’s presence in the world and incarnate that presence. God 
has shared himself in what is ordinary and close, law (revealed and 
human) and its interpretation.21 According to this Jewish vision, one 
does not need to yearn after a good not yet realized (or a Geist not yet 
concretized!) to have properly religious vision, or to see the sacred in 
                                                     
21 Interestingly, in their response to Taylor, Hauerwas and Coles have suggested that 
Taylor’s use of the terms “immanence” and” transcendence” treats them as general 
categories, and thus lacking in “Christological discipline.” “For Christians,” they 
write, “immanence first and foremost names that God became man that we might par-
ticipate in the very life of God…. [T]ranscendence first and foremost is the acknowl-
edgement that death could not hold him.” Hauerwas and Coles, “Long Live the 
Weeds,” 350. 
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the world. God is present in law. We may struggle to interpret laws, 
but, Kavka suggests, such practical work is preferable, to constructing 
a new and reconciling common vision of human fullness.  
Kavka draws on Maimonides’s account of the relation among 
kinds of laws, especially among divine and human laws, to articulate 
his own account of how Jews are to reason practically in a secular age 
and in societies where they are a minority. For Maimonides, laws are 
to be distinguished by focusing on their effects on the person (or com-
munity) who obeys them. The whole center of gravity in a discussion 
about politics from a Maimonidean perspective shifts from the con-
text, meaning, or “ground” of laws to what laws bring about. Now, it 
is certainly the case that Maimonides believed that the two main types 
of law—divine and human law—function to bring about different 
goods. He held to a hierarchy among the kinds of law, with revealed 
law at the top, and even seemed to belittle human laws as the “whim 
of the chief.”22 Nevertheless, at least as Kavka reads him, the focus of 
Maimonides on the effects of laws as what makes them divine leaves 
open to the Jew that a human law may unintentionally bring about the 
same effects as revealed law. Thus, the relation of kinds of law, so 
understood, leaves open the possibility of overlap among divine and 
human laws.  
Further, there are, naturally, superior goods (i.e., full human per-
fection) that flow properly only from revealed law. Yet these goods 
are kept by Maimonides somewhat separate from politics, whose aims 
are or should be the goods of basic welfare. These latter goods, more-
over, are thought by him to be necessary as conditions for pursuing 
the superior goods. This, for Kavka, changes the game from Taylor’s. 
He writes, 
 
One of the things that conceptualizing the relationship between law 
and divinity in a Maimonidean manner implies—again, for us readers 
of Maimonides in a secular age—is that members of a polity can differ 
completely as to visions of the good life, or to a person’s final aim, 
and still find consensus on social and political matters.23 
 
It also represents hope for the culture wars: 
 
When the mediation of transcendence is described, as it is by Taylor, 
only in terms of the production of a frame in which members of a 
polity can make choices about the good life—choices that, as seen 
                                                     
22 Kavka, “What is Immanent,” 130 
23 Kavka, “What is Immanent,” 130 
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earlier, will inevitably come into conflict with others’ choices, pro-
ducing social instability—the possibility of consensus will recede into 
the distance, and the Kulturkampf will perdure.24 
 
In sum, Kavka provides both a persuasive explanation of why Tay-
lor overlooks the Jews in his grand narrative and challenges the an-
thropology that guides this narrative. Kavka accomplishes the former 
when he shows how Taylor adopts Hegelian concepts that make reli-
gious difference appear problematic. With regard to the latter, Kavka’s 
example provides evidence that Taylor’s theological anthropology, 
structured as it is, cannot accommodate Judaism. He has therefore 
shown that Taylor’s theological anthropology does not have a unique 
claim on the imagination of how to go on as religious persons in a 
secular age. 
 
NARRATIVE IDENTITY AND PRACTICAL REASON:  
ON CHARLES TAYLOR AND MORAL THEOLOGY 
Beginning with what we can learn from Kavka’s criticisms, this 
final section explores how moral theologians ought to regard Taylor’s 
work in relation to their own. What might we learn from Kavka’s 
claim that rabbinic Judaism, a la his appropriation of Maimonides, 
does not fit within Taylor’s account of religion in our times? In diag-
nosing Taylor’s omission of rabbinic Judaism from his narrative, 
Kavka highlights (and challenges) Taylor’s anthropological frame, be-
hind which he senses the presence of Hegel. Reading Taylor’s Hegel 
reinforces my impression that Kavka is right in intuiting that Taylor 
remains captivated by Hegel’s project in important ways.25  
Taylor situates Hegel’s project in what he takes to be the funda-
mental (philosophical) problem of his era. It is an anthropological 
problem.26 The birth of modern conceptions of the “subject” gives rise 
to two competing views of freedom. There is the freedom of a sub-
ject’s power to dominate (objectify) nature, and there is the freedom 
of restored harmony between the self and nature. The self, then, lives 
in the cross pressures of these two conceptions of freedom, and the 
immanent-transcendent dialectic responds to this tension in the self.  
                                                     
24 Kavka, “What is Immanent,” 130. Kavka, in other words, is trying to avoid the 
contentious way of framing cultural conflict that seems to flow from Taylor’s frame, 
such as the following, from A Secular Age:” In our religious lives we are responding 
to a transcendent reality. We all have some sense of this, which emerges in our iden-
tifying and recognizing some mode of what I have called fullness, and seeking to 
attain it. Modes of fullness recognized by exclusive humanists, and others that remain 
within the immanent frame [of secularity, naturalism, and Zweckrationalität], are 
therefore responding to that transcendent reality, but misrecognizing it” (768). 
25 Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1975). 
26 For a contextual account of the problem to which Hegel was responding, see Taylor, 
Hegel, 1-50. 
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The problem that motivates Hegel is re-articulated by Taylor, but 
basically adopted as his own preoccupation. Yet this very problem, an 
anthropology so understood, is what generates the project of re-narrat-
ing the universal—i.e., the grand teleological arc that can be found in 
Taylor’s Sources of the Self and A Secular Age.  
To gain or reinforce a critical angle on Taylor in a way sensitized 
by our engagement with Kavka, we might contrast Taylor’s Hegelian 
approach to different kind of narrative. I have in mind the narrative 
undertaken by Gerhard Lohfink in answer to the titular question of his 
book, Does God Need the Church?27 It emerges in the course of the 
narrative that the story’s author, in an ultimate sense, is God. But the 
identity of this God, who is revealed in the narrative, is such as to be 
inextricably intertwined with the created world and, in particular, the 
lives of a people in whom he is particularly invested. Indeed, God’s 
story is importantly the same as that of the people called Israel, as Is-
rael—for the formative portion of the narrative—is striving to become 
a people, in the sense of having a strong, common identity. This iden-
tity is ordered to the promise and call to be God’s presence in the 
world. But the story is in large part a history of that community’s failed 
attempts, or hypotheses, regarding the social form that would be fitting 
for them to adopt. This story of a people embodies the genre of a 
quest.28 In the pattern of failure and new beginning, exile and return, 
which is renewed in a decisive way in the incarnation of the Son in 
Jesus Christ and in the launching of the journey of the church, God as 
the ultimate author is gradually revealed as forgiving and generous; to 
say that God is “almighty” means that God has “all the time in the 
world” to carry the story to its completion without compelling by force 
the people he has gathered as his family.29  
Kavka’s concern, as I understand it, is that Taylor’s narrative of 
social identity is such that it papers over differences in its eagerness to 
arrive at commonality and recognition (amid the politics of identity). 
In so doing it displays a willingness to posit a “we” that presumes a 
reconciliation not (yet) achieved. I have drawn on Lohfink here to im-
ply that this is not the kind of “we” posited within the story told 
through the Scripture and liturgies of the people of God. This “we” 
stands in the midst of a story where God is made known as the one 
who carries out his purposes at a pace his people can keep. The “we” 
                                                     
27 Gerhard Lohfink’s, Does God Need the Church: Toward a Theology of the People 
of God (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1999). 
28 Lohfink, Does God Need the Church, 106-20. Lohfink draws on the Old Testament 
in its historical context to show that Israel’s quest for a social form is inseparable from 
its identity as the people through whom God is uniquely present in the world. On the 
one hand, the biblical record may not conclusively name the form of God’s people—
for it is as much an account of their failed attempts to live as God’s people, a kind of 
series of hypotheses being tested and found wanting (119).  
29 Lohfink, Does God Need the Church, 39-49.  
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of the people of God is thus schooled in a kind patience, a patience 
formed by the acknowledgment that God’s end is both already and not 
yet. To say that this narrative is “universal,” or aspires to be, is simply 
to say that the God of Israel is the God who created (and redeemed) 
all creation in love. But the language of “universal” is perhaps wisely 
dropped. 
 
THE CHURCH’S NARRATIVE AND PRACTICAL REASON 
Lohfink’s narrative thus responds to Kavka’s concern that Taylor’s 
narrative presumes too much. Taylor’s story is told from outside the 
practical life of a historical community. With this point made, what 
remains to be done is to spell out what all this implies about the dis-
position Christian ethicists ought to adopt toward Taylor. I will offer 
a proposal mainly by explaining the difference Lohfink’s narrative 
makes for how moral theologians are to understand their task.  
At the outset of this paper, I suggested that Taylor was a philoso-
pher deeply concerned with practical reason. We moral theologians 
are likely to feel attracted to him for his great strides in defeating re-
ductive accounts of human behavior, i.e., objectivist (naturalist) ex-
planations. In addition, he has become recently more willing to write 
about theological matters, and in a way that puts in play his own reli-
gious experiences. Further, the focus on religion in A Secular Age 
leads ultimately to the question of how people of faith, Catholic Chris-
tians in particular, are to understand their position and possibilities in 
a secularized social world. For all these reasons, Taylor therefore 
seems like he would be a good dialogue partner for moral theologians.  
But citing Steinfels, I also drew attention to how his recommenda-
tions with regard to how to go on were lacking in traction. His exam-
ples of modern religious persons include people of extraordinary tal-
ents, and in discussing them his focus regards their unique itineraries 
of faith with little attention to their participation in local churches. 
What’s more, with Kavka, I pointed out that Taylor’s anthropolog-
ical approach is correlative with a narrative that subsumes religious 
difference, presuming a “we” that is not (yet) realized. Drawing on 
Lohfink, I intimated that Taylor’s form of narration overlooks every-
day Christians in the same way it does Jews. I therefore conclude that 
Taylor represents a temptation to moral theologians. He is not quite 
the friend we may have taken him to be, and therefore we should en-
gage him cautiously.  
Why I think Taylor may lead us to distort our basic task as moral 
theologians can be spelled out by further explicating how his narrative 
contrasts with Lohfink’s. The “we” that functions in relation to the 
narrative displayed in Taylor’s Sources of the Self and A Secular 
Age—his “big books”—is one that, I will now claim, stands “outside” 
the unfolding of the story itself. By contrast, the “we” of Lohfink’s 
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story, the people of God, stands “inside” the story. That is to say, it is 
the story of an incarnate God. 
A natural challenge to my claim would ask whether Taylor’s “we” 
is really outside of the unfolding events of his narrative, especially 
when he himself is present in the culminating characterization of what 
it may mean to be religious in our times. Further, the objection could 
be understandably raised that, unlike what is implied in Hegel’s sys-
tem, Taylor recognizes the basic contingency in the narrative of our 
search for the good.  
The defense of my claim, and my articulation of how the task of 
the moral theologian differs from what Taylor’s narrative might lead 
us to expect, comes with returning to my introductory description of 
Taylor as a practical reasoner. To begin with, Taylor certainly raises 
the question, “What is the nature of the good?” However, his thinking 
does not engage the more practical question, “What ought X to do?” 
We might say that his thinking is more akin to the theoretical reason-
ing of synderesis30 than to practical reasoning per se.31 It is the mark 
of practical reasoning that it terminates in an action.  
As Herbert McCabe has pointed out, it is human for the end which 
we intend to be held before us by the intellect, and this is the function 
of synderesis, but the virtue of practical reason, prudentia, is funda-
mentally concerned with how well we bring a will for the good into 
the life of action here and now.32 While synderesis provides the terms 
or first principles within which such reasoning is carried out, practical 
deliberation is not about these terms or principles but about a possible 
way forward in action.  
Interpreting Aquinas, McCabe goes on to say that prudentia, or 
“good sense,” depends more determinatively on the activity of the 
bodily senses than the mind. For unlike the relatively straightforward 
steps of theoretical logic, to do practical reasoning well requires taking 
into account to a wide array of particulars, and what is crucial is the 
perception of these. For this, our senses need to be in good shape and 
                                                     
30 Whether it is proper to attribute synderesis to theoretical reason rather than practical 
reason is a matter I think to be arguable. I have gone with “theoretical” here to em-
phasize that Taylor’s discussion of practical reason focuses more on the way reason 
illuminates the field of action than on discerning steps that lead to a realization of the 
good end. 
31 I owe this insight to my colleague Brad Kallenberg at the University of Dayton. 
32 I am here drawing on what I have learned about Aquinas from Herbert McCabe. 
Elucidating Aquinas on these matters, McCabe writes, “The intellectual grasp of the 
aim as aim (not attraction to it and intention of it, which is the actualization of will, 
but the understanding of it) is synderesis.” Herbert McCabe, “Aquinas on Good 
Sense,” New Blackfriars 67, 796 (Oct 1986): 426. 
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well-tuned. The grasping of the salient particular is ultimately done by 
a bodily gesture such as pointing at it.33  
I use this distinction to draw attention to the fact that there is a kind 
of theoretical reasoning involved in morality, but it is far from the 
whole of what moral reasoning requires. We need a certain illumina-
tion of the field, but we need also the ability to reason well as we carry 
an intention into action in concrete circumstances. I believe Taylor re-
mains at this speculative level, and this is telling. It correlates well 
with the conclusion I drew from my reading of Kavka that Taylor’s 
narrative is told from the “outside.”  
Adopting something like Lohfink’s narrative and attempting to 
identify with the “we” of the people of God, the moral theologian rea-
sons practically from “the inside.” My point is that for those whose 
narratives place them on the “inside,” practical reasoning will be more 
like what McCabe, following Aquinas, describes it to be. This practi-
cal reasoning will be more akin to finding our way through a world of 
multifarious particulars with our ultimate end neither fully apparent 
nor totally opaque. Here practical reasoning is all about how to go on 
in these concrete circumstances, to make the next move. My aim is to 
suggest that moral theologians ought to see their task as helping our-
selves and other Christians to carry out such reasoning well. Not un-
like Kavka’s Jewish reasoners who look for signs of God’s incarnation 
in civil laws and seek to revise such laws when they find no such signs, 
the moral theologian seeks a way forward in light of what God has 
done and promises to do. This reasoning embodies an eschatological 
patience, which recognizes that our deliberations and actions, while 
consequential, need not bear the burden to ultimately determine their 
own meanings.  
 
 
                                                     
33 McCabe, “Aquinas on Good Sense,” 429-30. We may comment here that this ren-
dition of practical reasoning, drawing on McCabe’s discussion of Aquinas’s pru-
dentia, implies a bodily formation if it is to be done well. Thus, Hauerwas and Coles 
have challenged Taylor’s portrait of Gerard Manley Hopkins as a modern convert on 
the grounds that he disassociates Hopkins’s poetic imagination from his liturgical life. 
While Taylor praises poets like Hopkins for enlarging our capacities of being, he does 
not attend to the way Hopkins’s poetry is shaped by life of daily prayer and worship. 
The narrow conception of language implied here runs against the grain of Taylor’s 
better insights. This, in my terms, is evidence that Taylor’s account of the possibilities 
for being religious in our day is shaped by his Hegelian anthropology. Hauerwas and 
Coles, “Long Live the Weeds,” 352. 
